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PUBLIC PURPOSE AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
The Montana Perspective*
Mae Nan Ellingson** and Jerry C.D. Mahoney***
I. INTRODUCTION: MONTANA'S ECONOMY
Over the past several years Montana consistently has been
characterized as having a poor business climate. For example, in its
seventh annual study of general manufacturing climates of the
forty-eight contiguous states, Grant Thornton rated Montana's
business climate forty-sixth nationally and ninth out of nine re-
gionally. The study compared Montana with other states on such
factors as taxes, debt, welfare expenditures, wages, unionization,
workers' compensation, the characteristics of the work force, en-
ergy costs, environmental control and population density. In the
1986 ranking, the analysts categorized all these factors as govern-
mental factors and non-governmental factors; Montana's govern-
mental factors ranking was forty-one, and its non-governmental
factors ranking was forty-four.
Using a slightly different ranking system in 1988 (again the
higher the number, the more unfavorable the rating), Grant
Thornton ranked the states in five separate categories. Montana's
ranking in those categories were: government fiscal policies, forty-
* This paper was presented as part of the Finance Panel at the Constitutional Sympo-
sium '89, November 16, 1989. Members of the panel included Mae Nan Ellingson, modera-
tor, Chet Blaylock, Wendy A; Fitzgereld, Daniel Kemmis, James Koch, Justice Russell Mc-
Donough, and Thomas Towe.
** B.S., University of Montana, 1972; J.D., University of Montana, 1976; Delegate to
the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention; Partner with Dorsey & Whitney, Missoula,
Montana.
*** B.S.L., University of Minnesota 1953; LL.B., University of Minnesota 1955; Part-
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sixth; employment costs, forty-first; labor costs, twenty-sixth; use
of resources, thirty-ninth; and quality of life, thirteenth.
Inc. magazine's 1988 Report on the States, rating all fifty
states on the basis of new jobs, new companies and climate for
growth during the preceding four years, rated Montana forty-
eighth.1 Recent studies reflect a deterioration of Montana's eco-
nomic health during the early eighties in relation to other states.2
Concern about this decline has caused many Montanans to give
economic development and improvement of the state's business
climate top priority for the collective will. Even those who believe
the government that governs best is the government that governs
least have come to believe that government has a role to play in
the economic development and well-being of the state. In Novem-
ber of 1983, by initiative, Montana voters mandated that the state
invest in the state's economy a portion of its coal severance tax
trust fund, which had been established by a constitutional amend-
ment in 1976., The stated objectives of the initiative were to diver-
sify, strengthen and stabilize the Montana economy, and to in-
crease Montana employment.' This initiative, as implemented by
the legislature, became the Montana In-State Investment Act.'
The Act became the centerpiece of the "Build Montana Program,"
the legislative package proposed by Governor Ted Schwinden and
enacted into law in 1983. Other programs included the Economic
Development Bond Act,6 which this paper will discuss in greater
detail, the Montana Capital Company Act,7 the Municipal Finance
Consolidation Act,8 the Montana Health Facility Authority Act,9
and the Montana Agricultural Loan Authority Act."0 In 1985, the
Montana Legislature enacted the Science and Technology Financ-
ing Act, 1 which this paper also will discuss in greater detail.
But even before these programs were enacted as part of a con-
certed economic-development program, the Montana Legislature
had given local governments some economic-development tools. In
1975, it authorized city or county voters to impose upon them-
1. INC., Report on the States: 1988, 79, 81 (Oct. 1988) [hereinafter INC.].
2. Id.
3. Mont. Initiative 95, approved November 2, 1982 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §
17-6-304 (1989)).
4. Id.
5. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 17-6-301 to -331 (1989).
6. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 17-5-1501 to -1529 (1989).
7. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 90-8-101 to -321 (1989).
8. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 17-5-1601 to -1651 (1989).
9. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 90-7-101 to -121 (1989).
10. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 80-12-101 to -403 (1989).
11. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 90-3-101 to -901 (1989).
1990]
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selves for economic-development purposes a tax of one mill for a
period not to exceed five years.'2 In 1974, the legislature authorized
municipalities to create urban-renewal districts, to use tax-incre-
ment financing, to exercise the power of eminent domain and to
cooperate with private enterprise for redevelopment of blighted ar-
eas within the municipalities.'" As early as 1965, cities and counties
had been given the authority to issue industrial development reve-
nue bonds for various industrial and commercial projects owned by
private entities. 4 By issuing such bonds, a local government was
able to provide tax-exempt financing, and corresponding lower in-
terest rates, to a private business, if the project to be financed met
certain requirements under the federal tax code.
In enacting these programs, Montana was not necessarily forg-
ing new ground. Rather, it was making a concerted effort to com-
pete with the economic-development activities being undertaken in
other states. As reported in 1988:
[Pennsylvania] .. .created a program using public money as a
lure to coax more start-up [companies] .... Michigan used small
amounts of public money to create incentives for much larger
amounts of private investment and tapped public pension money
to fund new businesses .... Ohio offers matching grants for prom-
ising new companies and .. .[tihe state's public pension funds
have invested .. .in new ventures .... 5
A recent article prepared for the Montana Chamber of Com-
merce Legislative Action Session concluded "that specific subsidies
and tax benefits for this or that firm is the wrong tack-it gets
governments and businesses intertwined and distorts incentives."' 6
Although some would disagree about the effectiveness and propri-
ety of government's role in economic development, the term pub-
lic-private partnership has become a buzzword at both the state
and local level.
It has become clear in recent years that as states and localities
compete for businesses, legislators and other public officials are be-
ing called upon to consider, or are themselves proposing, in the
name of a public-private partnership, a wide range of possible leg-
islative actions, such as property-tax exemptions, low interest loans
12. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 90-5-112 (1989).
13. 1974 Mont. Laws 287 (codified as amended in various sections of Mont. Code Ann.
tit. 7, ch. 15, pt. 42 (1989)).
14. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 90-5-102 (1989).
15. INC., supra note 1, at 79.
16. Meiners, Prospects for Growth in Montana 13 (paper presented at Chambers Leg-
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or guarantees, grants, sales-tax exemptions, tax-exempt bond fi-
nancing, eminent domain, tax increments and zoning variations."
Recent developments in Montana emphasize that not only must
the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of such proposals be considered,
but the proposals' constitutionality must be considered as well.
Although it is true that most states have very similar constitu-
tional provisions that bear on the state's ability to undertake eco-
nomic-development programs, the interpretation of these provi-
sions by the state's highest court may put that state at a
disadvantage when competing with other states in economic devel-
opment. For example, the Montana Supreme Court struck down
two fairly recent economic-development programs authorized by
the Montana Legislature.' 8 The purpose of this paper is to review
the decisions of the Montana Supreme Court under both the 1889
and 1972 Constitutions in an attempt to draw some conclusions
about permissible economic-development activities for govern-
ments in Montana.
Of the several provisions of the 1972 Montana Constitution
pertinent to this study, two are of critical importance:
(a) article VIII, section 1 (Public Purpose Clause) provides:
"Taxes shall be levied by general laws for public purposes."
(b) article V, section 11(5) (Appropriation Clause) provides: "No
appropriation shall be made for religious, charitable, industrial,
educational, or benevolent purposes to any private individual,
private association, or private corporation not under control of
the state."
The provision that taxes must be levied for public purposes
appeared in article XII, section 11 of the 1889 Constitution; the
prohibition against appropriations to entities not under the control
of the state formerly appeared in article V, section 35 of the 1889
Constitution. The 1889 Constitution contained another provision
(the Loan of Credit Clause)' 9 omitted from the 1972 Constitution,
apparently because it was considered to be essentially the same as
the Public Purpose Clause. Because the Montana Supreme Court
often interpreted the Loan of Credit Clause, it also is important to
this analysis. The omitted 1889 clause stated that:
Neither the state, nor any county, city, town, municipality, nor
any other subdivision of the state shall ever give or loan its credit
17. See Gold, Economic Development Projects: A Perspective, 19 URBAN LAWYER 193
(1987) [hereinafter Gold].
18. See Hollow v. State, 222 Mont. 478, 723 P.2d 227 (1986); White v. State, 233
Mont. 81, 759 P.2d 971 (1988).
19. MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XIII, § 1.
1990]
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in aid of, or make any donation or grant, by subsidy or otherwise,
to any individual, association or corporation, or become a sub-
scriber to, or a shareholder in, any company or corporation, or a
joint owner with any person, company or corporation, except as to
such ownership as may accrue to the state by operation or provi-
sion of law.2
Although omitted from the 1972 Constitution, this restriction is
still imposed on counties by statute, but not on cities.21
A systematic analysis of the Montana Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of these provisions is handicapped by the court's periodic
failure to discuss separately the application of the separate provi-
sions of the constitution. In addition, the court periodically fails to
recognize that a particular decision is at variance with one or more
earlier decisions. The following analysis will discuss chronologically
the separate provisions of the constitution. This necessarily pro-
duces some overlap or repetition because most decisions do, in
fact, involve at least two of the separate provisions of the
constitution.
II. PUBLIC PURPOSE: PRINCIPALLY A LEGISLATIVE DECISION
Montana courts, as well as courts in other jurisdictions, have
endorsed the general proposition that the determination of public
purpose is one primarily to be made by the legislature, and one
that will not be interfered with unless a clear abuse of power has
occurred.22 The presumption of validity and judicial deference to
the legislative determination is not always sufficient for a particu-
lar law.2" The presumption of validity also requires recognition
that the constitution is organic and should be interpreted in light
of contemporary circumstances.24
20. Id.
21. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-7-2103 (1989).
22. Lewis and Clark County v. Industrial Accident Bd. of Montana, 52 Mont. 6, 12,
155 P. 268, 271 (1916) ("The power of taxation is a legislative prerogative, and therefore the
determination of the question whether a particular purpose is or is not one which so inti-
mately concerns the public as to render taxation permissible is for the legislature in the first
instance."). The general rule of constitutional law that courts will indulge every reasonable
presumption in favor of legislation applies with peculiar force to the case of a legislative
decision upon the purpose for which a tax may be laid. See State ex rel. Campbell v. Stew-
art, 54 Mont. 504, 171 P. 755 (1918); State ex rel. Mills v. Dixon, 66 Mont. 76, 84, 213 P.
227, 229 (1923) ("[t]he constitutionality of a legislative enactment is prima facie presumed,
and every intendment in its favor will be made unless its unconstitutionality appears be-
yond a reasonable doubt."); Stanley v. Jeffries, 86 Mont. 114, 133, 284 P. 134, 139 (1929)
("what is for the public good and what are public purposes are questions which the Legisla-
ture must decide upon its own judgment.").
23. Veterans' Welfare Comm'n v. VFW, 141 Mont. 500, 506, 379 P.2d 107, 110 (1963).
24. Huber v. Groff, 171 Mont. 442, 448, 558 P.2d 1124, 1127 (1976) (quoting Cotting-
360 [Vol. 51
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It is interesting that in the two most recent cases in which the
court determined the validity of economic-development legislation,
the court failed to state expressly this principle of constitutional
law. 25 Nonetheless, the principle is so firmly established in so many
contexts that its continuing validity cannot be seriously ques-
tioned. Perhaps it is fair to observe simply that if the court is up-
holding a law it will dwell on its deference to the legislative deter-
mination of public purpose; if, however, the court is denying the
validity of a law, judicial deference to the legislative determination,
and the presumption of validity that attaches to the legislation,
will receive short shrift.
III. THE PUBLIC PURPOSE CLAUSE
A comprehensive and useful definition of "public purpose"
within the meaning of article VIII, section 1 is elusive. Public pur-
pose, in this sense, may resemble art and pornography; it is hard to
define, but judges seem to know it when they see it.
In a landmark case, Loan Association v. Topeka,26 the United
States Supreme Court recognized the difficulty in defining public
purpose, and it suggested several defining factors:
It is undoubtedly the duty of the legislature which imposes or
authorizes municipalities to impose a tax to see that it is not to
be used for purposes of private interest. . . . [I]n deciding
whether, in the given case, the object for which the taxes are as-
sessed [public or private], [courts] must be governed mainly by
the course and usage of the government, the objects for which
taxes have been customarily and by long course of legislation lev-
ied, what objects or purposes have been considered necessary to
the support and for the proper use of the government, whether
State or municipal."
Today the United States Supreme Court has virtually withdrawn
from reviewing the legality, under the United States Constitution,
of state economic-development laws.2 8 The Topeka factors, how-
ever, have found their way into many texts and opinions of state
supreme courts applying provisions such as the Public Purpose
Clause.2 1 If public purpose were determined solely by usage, cus-
ham v. State Bd. Of Examiners, 134 Mont. 1, 11, 328 P.2d 907, 912 (1958)).
25. See Hollow v. State, 222 Mont. 478, 723 P.2d 227 (1986); White v. State, 233
Mont. 81, 759 P.2d 971 (1988).
26. 87 U.S. 655 (1874).
27. Id. at 664-65. See also Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
28. See Gold, supra note 17, at 206-08.
29. Stanley v. Jeffries, 86 Mont. 114, 130, 284 P. 134, 138 (1930) ("the true test is
1990]
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tom, and long course and acquiescence of the people, then new
public programs would be rare indeed. Much more important,
then, is the "true test," whether the program is one for the good of
the general public as distinguished from individual gain and pri-
vate objects."0 In Stanley v. Jeffries, the Montana Supreme Court
stated that a public purpose may be found in a program that is for
the general good of the inhabitants, satisfying their need or "con-
tributing to their convenience. "'31 Quite clearly, convenience goes
beyond necessity.
When a court is faced with a determination of whether a par-
ticular purpose or use is a public purpose or use, the reason almost
always centers on the legislation at hand benefitting, directly or
indirectly, a particular class or segment of the public more than it
is benefitting others. Quite clearly, private benefit is not a suffi-
cient basis for invalidating legislation. For example, in State ex rel.
Cryderman v. Wienrich,"2 the court upheld the 1915 Seed Grain
Law under which a county could make loans to needy farmers to
purchase seed grain. Recognizing that the loans aided farmers in
their private business, the court said:
If [the] object is to foster private enterprises and the only benefit
to be derived by the public is incidental and secondary, then the
[constitutional] restrictions apply, and the credit or donation may
not be granted; but if the primary object is to prevent a class of
needy citizens from becoming a permanent public charge, the fact
that their own efforts and self-respect are called in to aid the de-
sign cannot make it the less a public one."
The nexus between the Public Purpose Clause and the Appro-
priation Clause is unclear. No immediate, necessary connection ex-
ists between the two provisions. Moreover, the court has not often
addressed specifically the relationship between the two provisions.
Several times, however, the court has equated the two provisions.",
In addition, the court often has equated the principles of the two
provisions with the provisions of article XIII, section 1 of the 1889
Constitution.
whether the work to be done is essentially public and for the general good of the inhabi-
tants, satisfying their needs or contributing to their convenience, rather than merely for gain
or for private objects.").
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 54 Mont. 390, 170 P. 942 (1918).
33. Id. at 398, 170 P. at 946; 15 McQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (3d
ed. 1985) [hereinafter MCQUILLAN]; RHYNE, LAW OF LocAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 1723
(1980).
34. See, e.g., State ex rel. Normile v. Cooney, 100 Mont. 391, 47 P.2d 637 (1935).
362 [Vol. 51
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IV. THE APPROPRIATION CLAUSE
Both the 1889 Constitution and the 1972 Montana Constitu-
tion contain nearly identical appropriation clauses.3 5 The proceed-
ings of the constitutional convention make it apparent that the
changes in language from the 1889 Constitution to the 1972 Con-
stitution were not considered particularly significant. In Huber v.
Groff,36 the court noted the difference in language and said: "The
Convention Notes indicate there was no change between the new
and the old provision except as to grammar. It must then be as-
sumed the 1972 Montana Constitution expresses the intent of the
framers more precisely. ' 37 Consequently, it must be assumed that
the pre-1972 cases are appropriate for consideration in applying
the provision of the 1972 Constitution.
An early case suggests the Appropriation Clause does not ap-
ply to local units of government.38 In Cryderman, the court was
asked to enjoin county commissioners from holding a special elec-
tion under the Seed Grain Law. 9 The plaintiff argued the law vio-
lated the Appropriation Clause, to which the court replied: "Sec-
tion 35 of Article V has no relevancy here; it is addressed to the
legislature, and no appropriation by the legislature for any purpose
is involved."'
The Montana Supreme Court often has treated an Appropria-
tion Clause challenge as if it were a challenge to the Public Pur-
pose Clause." For example, in State ex rel. Normile v. Cooney,'
the plaintiff sought to enjoin the State Water Conservation Board
from proceeding with the construction of an irrigation and flood
control project in Carbon County." The board proposed to issue
its bonds, payable from the revenues of the project, consisting gen-
35. Article V, section 11(5) of the 1972 MONTANA CONSTITUTION states:
No appropriation shall be made for religious, charitable, industrial, educational or
benevolent reasons to any private individual, private association or private corpo-
ration not under control of the state.
Article V, section 35 of the 1889 MONTANA CONsTITuTION states:
No appropriation shall be made for charitable, industrial, educational or benevo-
lent purposes to any person, corporation or community not under the absolute
control of the state, nor to any denominational or sectarian institution or
association.
36. 171 Mont. 442, 558 P.2d 1124 (1976).
37. Id. at 456, 558 P.2d at 1131-32.
38. State ex rel. Cryderman v. Wienrich, 54 Mont. 390, 170 P. 942 (1918).
39. Id. at 391, 170 P. at 943.
40. Id. at 398, 170 P. at 946.
41. State ex rel. Campbell v. Stewart, 54 Mont. 504, 171 P. 755 (1918); State ex rel.
Normile v. Cooney, 100 Mont. 391, 47 P.2d 637 (1935).
42. 100 Mont. 391, 47 P.2d 637 (1935).
43. Id. at 394-95, 47 P.2d at 639.
1990] 363
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erally of amounts received from the sale of water to a local water
users' association, which would take title to the project after the
bonds had been paid." The plaintiff based his challenge on the
Appropriation Clause, but the court based its analysis on whether
the purpose of the Act was a public purpose.45 The court cited pro-
visions of the constitution stating that the use of water within the
state shall be a public use.46 As to the application of the Appropri-
ation Clause, the court said simply: "The purpose of the appropri-
ation above referred to is for a public use. The water conservation
board is created by law. It is an agency of the state. It is under the
control of the state; hence the contention here made cannot pre-
vail. '47 It is not clear if the appropriation of which the plaintiff
complained was the appropriation to the State Water Conservation
Board, in which case the court's statement was appropriate and
sufficient. If, however, the appropriation to the water users' associ-
ation was by virtue of the benefits that the association would de-
rive from the construction of the project, then the court's response
was inappropriate and insufficient. Consequently, the court left
open the question whether a statute deemed to be an appropria-
tion of money directly to a person not under control of the state
would be permissible as long as the purpose was a public one.
If private individuals receive a benefit incidental to a public
program, it does not automatically violate the Appropriation
Clause.4 8 For example, in Douglas v. Judge,49 a taxpayer chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a 1975 law authorizing the issuance
of general-obligation bonds of the state, the proceeds of which
were to be used by the Board of Natural Resources and Conserva-
tion to finance renewable resource projects through grants to pub-
lic agencies, and loans to public agencies, farmers and ranchers.50
The court held that portion of the law authorizing loans to farmers
and ranchers invalid, because the law failed to provide sufficient
guidelines for the Board to use in evaluating projects for which it
received loan applications. 1 Addressing the applicability of the
44. Id. at 396, 47 P.2d at 640.
45. Id. at 407-08, 47 P.2d at 645-46.
46. Id. at 408, 47 P.2d at 645-46.
47. Id. at 408, 47 P.2d at 646. See also Veterans' Welfare Comm'n v. VFW, 141 Mont.
500, 509-10, 379 P.2d 107, 111 (1963).
48. Grossman v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 209 Mont. 427, 455-56, 682 P.2d
1319, 1334 (1984) ("as long as the provision relating to the expenditures of the funds derived
from the proceeds of the bonds are under the control of the state, the constitutional man-
date is satisfied.").
49. 174 Mont. 32, 568 P.2d 530 (1977).
50. Id. at 34-35, 568 P.2d at 531-32.
51. Id. at 40, 568 P.2d at 535.
364 [Vol. 51
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Appropriation Clause, however, the court stated:
Initially it is important to recognize that the funds in question
herein are not appropriated for the use of private persons, corpo-
rations or associations. The funds are appropriated for the use of
the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation. This de-
partment is then in turn directed by the . . . act to dispose of
these funds as directed by this act. . . . Total control over the
granting of these loans is vested in the Department .... We hold
that sufficient control over the appropriated funds is vested in the
state ... 52
It is important to note that the court deemed the Appropriation
Clause satisfied even with regard to the loans to farmers and
ranchers.
V. ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 1: THE LOAN OF CREDIT CLAUSE
Under the 1889 Constitution's Loan of Credit Clause, the state
and municipalities could not "give or loan . . credit" 53 or give or
donate funds to any private individual, company or corporation:
Neither the state, nor any county, city, town, municipality, nor
any other subdivision of the state shall ever give or loan its credit
in aid of, or make any donation or grant, by subsidy or otherwise,
to any individual, association or corporation, or become a sub-
scriber to, or a shareholder in, any company or corporation, or a
joint owner with any person, company or corporation, except as to
such ownership as may accrue to the state by operation or provi-
sion of law. 4
Apparently the 1972 Constitution omitted this section because it
was considered unnecessary or redundant in light of the provisions
of the Public Purpose Clause. The Revenue and Finance Commit-
tee explained in its committee report the omission to the constitu-
tional convention: "The [Loan of Credit Clause] is essentially a
public purpose question. The Montana Supreme Court has
equated the two concepts in its numerous interpretations of the
'lending of credit clause.' -55 In fact, the language of the 1889 Loan
of Credit Clause seems closer to the language of the Appropriation
Clause than to the Public Purpose Clause. Perhaps, then, the 1972
delegates thought that in light of both the Appropriation Clause
and the Public Purpose Clause, it was not necessary to retain the
52. Id. at 37-38, 568 P.2d at 533.
53. MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XIII, § 1.
54. Id.
55. See II MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS 583 (1972).
1990] 365
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Loan of Credit Clause. In either event, and because no intent ex-
isted to repeal or to do away with the object of that section, it is
appropriate to review the cases interpreting that section.
An early case indicated that a public purpose was not suffi-
cient to overcome an attack based on the Appropriation Clause or
Loan of Credit Clause. In Hill v. Rae, the court upheld the basic
provisions of the 1915 Farm Loan Act, under which the state is-
sued its bonds to finance loans to farmers.5 The bonds were se-
cured by mortgages on the farm lands of the borrowers and by a
guaranty fund to which the state appropriated $20,000.1 Under
the appropriation and loan of credit clauses, the court found the
guaranty fund provision invalid, stating: "It will not suffice to say
that, the general purposes of the Act being to foster agriculture,
and thus to promote the public welfare, such purpose is a public
one ... money for them may not be appropriated unless the spe-
cific objects are under the absolute control of the state."58
Two years later, however, when it upheld the 1915 Seed Grain
Law under which counties could issue general-obligation bonds to
fund seed-grain loans to needy farmers, the court indicated that
public purpose could overcome an attack on the Loan of Credit
Clause.59 In Cryderman, the court found that a provision of aid to
needy farmers to prevent them from becoming paupers and requir-
ing state relief constituted a public purpose.6 " The plaintiff com-
plained that because the seed grain aided the farmers in their busi-
ness the law violated the Loan of Credit Clause, but the court
rejected this complaint, saying that as long as the primary purpose
served the public, the private benefit did not defeat the validity of
the provision.6 1 Further, the court ruled the Appropriation Clause
irrelevant because the Appropriation Clause was "addressed to the
Legislature, and no appropriation by the Legislature for any pur-
pose [was] involved. ' 62 Interestingly, the court did not cite to Hill.
Two months later, in State ex rel. Campbell v. Stewart,63 the
court upheld the War Defense Act, which authorized the state to
issue its general-obligation bonds to fund a program of loans to
farmers to encourage and to assist the production of food as part
56. 52 Mont. 378, 158 P. 826 (1916).
57. Id. at 381, 158 P. at 828.
58. Id. at 389, 158 P. at 831.
59. State ex rel. Cryderman v. Wienrich, 54 Mont. 390, 170 P. 942 (1918).
60. Id. at 396, 170 P. at 945.
61. Id. at 398, 170 P. at 946.
62. Id.
63. 54 Mont. 504, 171 P. 755 (1918).
[Vol. 51
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of the war effort."' The court easily dismissed the claim that the
law violated the Appropriation Clause when it stated: "This is
manifestly not such an appropriation, and the mere fact that the
moneys may be effective through individuals, associations or cor-
porations in certain ways does not make it so."" For this proposi-
tion the court cited Cryderman6 But, of course, the Cryderman
court had found the Appropriation Clause inapplicable because it
involved a county rather than the state. 7 Thus, it is somewhat less
than "manifest" why this was not an appropriation subject to the
Appropriation Clause. As for the Loan of Credit Clause, the court
found the primary public purpose sufficient, saying whether a loan,
extension of credit, or donation exists is only secondary; the true
purpose is the "most public one that could well be imagined," the
defense of the country." Although loans or gifts may be employed
to that end, "the outstanding and controlling public purpose is the
end that justifies and validates the means." 9 The court cited
Hill,70 but did not distinguish its earlier statement that a public
purpose could not overcome the Loan of Credit Clause.
After World War I, veterans needed help, not farmers. In
1922, voters approved by referendum a 1921 law authorizing a pay-
ment to each World War I veteran of ten dollars for each month of
service, not to exceed two hundred dollars, which would be paid
from proceeds of general-obligation bonds of the state. The Mon-
tana Supreme Court held the law unconstitutional in State ex rel.
Mills v. Dixon.1 The court reasoned that the state had no legal
obligation to pay its veterans, and any obligation existing was a
"so-called moral obligation," which was not sufficient to overcome
constitutional prohibitions. 72 Although this decision was later over-
ruled,73 the Dixon court noted, "[P]ublic money cannot be used to
pay a gratuity to an individual when he is without legal claim to
the money, and when it cannot fairly be said that the public good
will be served by such payment .. . . ",74 This suggests that even if
the state is not legally obligated to make the payment, this law will
64. Id. at 507, 171 P. at 756.
65. Id. at 509, 171 P. at 757.
66. Id.
67. Cryderman, 54 Mont. 398, 170 P. at 946.
68. Campbell, 54 Mont. at 510, 171 P. at 757.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 509, 171 P. at 757.
71. 66 Mont. 76, 213 P. 227 (1923).
72. Id. at 94, 213 P. at 233.
73. State ex rel. Graham v. Board of Examiners, 125 Mont. 419, 438, 239 P.2d 283, 294
(1952).
74. Dixon, 66 Mont. at 94, 213 P. at 233.
1990]
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be upheld if the basis for the payment is a public good, such as
assistance to temporarily unemployed veterans.75
The court addressed appropriations to veterans again in Vet-
erans Welfare Commission v. VFW.76 The legislature had appro-
priated six thousand dollars per year from the general fund to the
state's Veterans Welfare Commission for "[p]ayment of secretarial
services to those veterans' organizations maintaining full-time ser-
vice offices at Fort Harrison .... ,,77 Two veterans' organizations
maintained such offices.78 The court stated that on its face the law
seemed to violate both article V, section 35, as an appropriation to
a corporation not under the control of the state, and the Loan of
Credit Clause, as a donation or grant to a corporation. 79 The veter-
ans' organizations argued, on the strength of the State ex rel Gra-
ham v. Board of Examiners decision,80 that legislation on behalf of
veterans served a public purpose.8 1 The court said it would assume
a public purpose, but that was not sufficient under the Loan of
Credit Clause. 2
Fickes v. Missoula County 3 was the last case interpreting the
Loan of Credit Clause before it was dropped from the 1972 Consti-
tution. Pursuant to the 1965 Industrial Development Bond Act,8"'
Missoula County proposed to issue its revenue bonds in the
75. In fact, thirty years later, in State ex rel. Graham v. Board of Examiners, 125
Mont. 419, 438, 239 P.2d 283, 294 (1952), the court expressly overruled Mills. The issue was
essentially the same; the voters (in 1950) authorized payment of "an honorarium, or ad-
justed compensation" to each veteran of World War II. Id. at 422, 239 P.2d at 286. Interest-
ingly, the basic amount payable in 1950 was the same as in 1922, $10 per month of military
service. Id. The Court said "that a public purpose is served by legislation on behalf of veter-
ans is now so thoroughly established that there can be no further debate." Id. Mills v. Stew-
art overruled the proposition that a moral obligation is not sufficient to support an appro-
priation of public money as held in Mills v. Dixon. In fact, in Stewart the court had
distinguished, not overruled Dixon, because the appropriation in Stewart paid a legal debt
owed by the state. Lest there should be any doubt, however, the court added, "That part of
[Dixon] in conflict with the views herein expressed is expressly overruled." Id. at 438, P.2d
at 294. One is left to wonder what part of Dixon is not overruled.
76. 141 Mont. 500, 379 P.2d 107 (1963).
77. Id. at 502, 379 P.2d at 108.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 507, 379 P.2d at 110.
80. 125 Mont. 419, 438, 239 P.2d 283, 294 (1952). For a discussion of Graham, see
supra note 75.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 510-11, 379 P.2d at 111-12, (quoting Cramer v. Montana State Bd. of Food
Distrib., 113 Mont. 450, 453, 129 P.2d 96, 97 (1942) and Sjostrum v. State Highway
Comm'n, 124 Mont. 562, 567, 228 P.2d 238, 240 (1951)). In citing and quoting Cramer the
court apparently overlooked the fact that in Jones v. Burns, 138 Mont. 268, 292, 357 P.2d
22, 34 (1960), the court expressly overruled Cramer on this point.
83. 155 Mont. 258, 470 P.2d 287 (1970).
84. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 90-5-101 to -305 (1989).
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amount of fourteen million dollars to finance the acquisition and
installation of certain air and water pollution control facilities at
the pulp and paper mill of Hoerner Waldorf Corporation. The
county would own the financed facilities but lease them to the cor-
poration.86 The bonds of the county were not a general obligation,
but were payable solely from the lease payments to be received
from the corporation. In response to the claim that the law vio-
lated the Loan of Credit Clause, the court noted that the test
"whether a donation or grant is prohibited . . . is whether the do-
nation or grant is for a public purpose. '87 Curiously, the court then
stated: "Thus, here, since no debt or liability is created, we look to
see if an indirect benefit to the industry by having a favorable type
of financing [tax exampt financing], will condemn the Act in ques-
tion."88 The court did not explain the significance of the absence of
a debt or liability. The county had found the project would in-
crease employment, "protect the health, safety and welfare" of its
citizens and improve the environment.8 9 Thus, said the court, "a
valid purpose appears." 90 The court discussed prior decisions and
stated, "The mere incidental benefits to a private corporation do
not change a public purpose to a private one being the loaning of
credit or aid as prohibited." 91 Although the court found no viola-
tion of the Loan of Credit Clause, it left unanswered the puzzling
and crucial question of whether a similar public purpose would be
sufficient if the "aid" or incidental benefit to a private party in-
volved a use of tax funds or proceeds of general-obligation bonds
of the governmental unit.
VI. THE RECENT CASES: White v. State and Hollow v. State
With this judicial history, little question remains that the
court must continuously be consulted about what constitutes a vio-
lation of the public purpose and appropriation clauses. This ques-
tion most frequently has been presented to the court in cases in-
volving the issuance of bonds by the state or one of its agencies or
political subdivisions, because the tax-exempt bond market gener-
ally requires that an "unqualified" opinion of bond counsel be fur-
85. Fickes, 155 Mont. at 260-61, 470 P.2d at 288.
86. Id. at 261, 470 P.2d at 288.
87. Id. at 267, 470 P.2d at 291 (quoting Willett v. State Bd. of Examiners, 112 Mont.
317, 322, 115 P.2d 287, 289 (1941)).
88. Id. at 267-68, 470 P.2d at 291-92 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 268, 470 P.2d at 292.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 269, 470 P.2d at 292.
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nished for issues of tax-exempt municipal bonds. Bond counsel
firms, however, generally are comfortable in rendering such an
opinion only if the highest court in the state has ruled affirmatively
on all constitutional issues raised by the new legislation or has pre-
viously ruled on similar legislation. Thus, if uncertainty exists,
bond counsel usually will require a "test case," in which all con-
ceivable constitutional challenges to the particular piece of new
legislation is put before the court for resolution before the bonds
can be sold. It was under these circumstances that the Montana
Supreme Court addressed the public purpose and appropriation is-
sues in White v. State92 and Hollow v. State."'
In 1983, the legislature enacted the Montana Economic Bond
Act 94 (the Bond Act), as part of the "Build Montana Program."
This Act gave the newly created Montana Economic Development
Board the same authority earlier granted to cities and towns to
issue industrial development revenue bonds.95 The Economic De-
velopment Board had been created principally to invest the "In-
State Investment Fund" created by Initiative 95 and the In-State
Investment Act.
The bonds issued by the Board under the 1983 law were paya-
ble solely from revenues provided by the parties to whom the
Board lent the proceeds of the bonds. Thus, they essentially were
the same as the revenue bonds issued by Missoula County and up-
held by the court in the Fickes case.96 In 1985, the legislature au-
thorized the Board, by a somewhat convoluted law, to guarantee
its revenue bonds by payments from the In-State Investment Fund
in an effort to make the bonds more marketable and to reduce the
effective interest rate of the loans to the private businesses.9 7 The
bill amended the In-State Investment Act to provide that, for pur-
poses of the Act, "investment" includes the "guaranty of loans or
bonds in consideration [of] a fee" and specifically authorized the
use of the In-State Investment Fund to guarantee either the loans
or the economic-development bonds issued by the Board.9 8 As an-
other mechanism for enhancing the creditworthiness of the bonds,
the Bond Act also allowed the Board to loan the In-state Invest-
ment Fund to the extent of the capital reserve account and the
92. 233 Mont. 81, 759 P.2d 971 (1988).
93. 222 Mont. 478, 723 P.2d 227 (1986).
94. MONT. CODE ANN. §3 17-5-1501 to -1529 (1989).
95. MONT. CODE ANN. §3 90-5-101 to -114 (1989).
96. Fickes, 155 Mont. 258, 470 P.2d 287.
97. 1985 Mont. Laws 640 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. 3§ 17-5-505 to -06, -6-308, -
311, -315 (1989)).
98. Id. at § 3 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-6-308 (1989)).
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guaranty.9 9 The maximum amount of the guaranty was limited by
law to three million dollars to an individual project. 100 As previ-
ously indicated, the In-State Investment Fund is derived princi-
pally from coal severance taxes.10 1 Thus, although the bonds issued
by the Board were revenue bonds, as in Fickes, the bonds also
would be secured by a guaranty funded from taxes.
Hollow v. State"2 tested the constitutionality of the aug-
mented Bond Act and the Public Purpose Clause and the Appro-
priation Clause again came before the court. The court, troubled
by the concept embodied in the new law that a "guaranty" consti-
tuted an "investment," nonetheless seemed to accept the proposi-
tion for purposes of the decision. The court found the augmented
Act unconstitutional, however, because the money in the In-State
Investment (derived from coal severance taxes) was used to "sat-
isfy guaranties of private debts or obligations.' ' 103 and therefore vi-
olated the Public Purpose Clause and the Appropriation Clause.
The court cited Veterans Welfare Commission v. VFW,"" as
authority for its holding, which invalidated the use of public funds
to pay the salary of the secretaries of two veterans' organiza-
tions.10 5 The court did not question (indeed, did not even discuss)
whether, through the issuance of its revenue bonds, the Board
might achieve the purposes for which the issuance of such bonds
had been authorized-promoting the general welfare, increasing
job opportunities, retaining existing jobs, and generally enhancing
economic development-nor did the court question that those pub-
lic purposes might be better achieved by reason of the guaranty
device.
Although the court did not specifically address whether the
purpose of the amended Bond Act (development of business) was a
public purpose, it held that coal taxes could not be used as con-
templated. 0 6 In doing so, the court may have implicitly acknowl-
edged that although a use of funds may be for a public purpose, it
is not a public purpose for which taxes can be levied. In Fickes, the
court held that the issuance of industrial development revenue
bonds was a public purpose for purposes of both the Appropriation
99. Id. (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 17-6-308(3) (1989)).
100. Id. (codified at MoNT. CODE ANN. § 17-6-308(2) (1989)).
101. MONT. CODE ANN § 17-6-306 (1989).
102. 222 Mont. 478, 723 P.2d 227 (1986).
103. Id. at 485, 723 P.2d at 232.
104. 141 Mont. 500, 379 P.2d 107 (1963).
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Clause and the Loan of Credit Clause. 107 The benefit a private
company obtained from the issuance of such bonds did not invali-
date the public purpose of the program in Fickes.08 It seems clear,
however, that the court's finding of public purpose in Fickes de-
pended on its finding that no tax dollars were being used to benefit
private entities."" In addition, recall that in Hill the issuance of
revenue bonds to make loans to farmers was a public purpose, but
using tax dollars to guarantee those bonds violated the Appropria-
tion Clause.'"
In Hollow, the court distinguished Huber v. Groff on the basis
that in that case the bonds were revenue bonds and did not in-
clude a pledge of credit of the state, but only a "moral commit-
ment" that the governor would request the legislature to appropri-
ate necessary funds to supplement the accounts for payment of the
bonds."' That technique, said the court, "is still open under this
decision. What we do not and cannot condone is the direct use of
tax monies by legislative provision which in effect directly pledges
the credit of the state to secure the bonds involved in this case.""'
One wonders why the "moral obligation or commitment,"
which if implemented would involve the direct appropriation of tax
dollars to pay for the bonds, is permissible under the public pur-
pose and appropriation clauses, but the pledge of tax dollars to
guaranty the bonds is not. Assuming the purpose is a public one,
the purpose of both would be the same. As one scholar has noted,
"[Iln determining what is a public purpose, it is not material
whether the question arises in connection with (1) expending mon-
eys on hand, (2) creation of floating indebtedness, (3) creation of
bonded indebtedness or (4) levy of taxes.""' 3 Hollow left critical
questions unanswered.
In 1985, the legislature enacted the Science and Technology
Development Board Seed Capital Bond Act (the Technology
Act)."' In doing so, the legislature hoped that technology invest-
ments would strengthen and diversify the economy of the state,
accelerate technological development, and create new jobs and bus-
107. Fickes v. Missoula County, 155 Mont. 258, 267, 470 P.2d 287, 291 (1970).
108. Id. at 268, 470 P.2d at 291-92.
109. The court stated, "Here every dollar expended on the bond issue is to be repaid
from and by the project the issue makes possible .... Thus, a valid purpose appears." Id. at
268, 470 P.2d at 292.
110. 52 Mont. 378, 158 P. 826 (1916).
111. 222 Mont. at 486, 723 P.2d at 232.
112. Id.
113. MCQUILLAN, supra note 33, § 39.19 at 38.
114. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 90-3-101 to -525 (1989).
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iness opportunities.'15 The Technology Act created a Science and
Technology Development Board and authorized it to issue bonds,
the proceeds of which would be used to make investments in seed
capital, start-up capital, and expansion capital projects for qualify-
ing science and technology companies."" The proceeds also were to
be used to invest in "certified Montana capital companies" making
technology investments. 1 7 The bonds of the Board would be paya-
ble from income received by the Board from its investments and
from the coal severance tax."18
In White v. State," 9 another test case, taxpayers sued for a
declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of the Act. The
plaintiffs argued first that the Act violated the Appropriation
Clause "because those investments ultimately benefit private indi-
viduals not under control of the state."' 20 In support of this pro-
position plaintiffs cited Hollow and Hill.'2 ' The Board, however,
citing Grossman v. State Department* of Natural Resources and
Huber v. Groif, argued that because the appropriations by the leg-
islature were to the Board, a public agency, no violation of the Ap-
propriation Clause occurred.12 2 The court, after indicating its anal-
ysis would be based on post-1972 decisions, summarized its
holdings in Huber and Grossman.'s3 However, the court held that
the principle of those cases-that appropriations to public entities
for a public purpose were constitutional even though money might
ultimately benefit private individuals or businesses through its use
by the state agency-limited by the decision in Hollow.'2
As to the Hollow case, the court said:
We held that the use of state tax revenues to secure the private
obligations of project participants and the bonds providing funds
for the benefit of their businesses violated ... the Montana Con-
stitution. We distinguished Huber in that the legislation in Huber
specifically did not pledge the credit of the state to secure the
bonds being issued. The Hollow legislation in effect directly
pledged the credit of the state to secure the bonds and guaranties
being used to benefit private business ventures.'25
115. MONT. CODE ANN. § 90-3-101(1) (1989).
116. MONT. CODE ANN. § 90-3-412 (1987) (repealed by 1989 Mont. Laws 316 § 24).
117. MONT. CODE ANN. § 90-3-415 (1987) (repealed by 1989 Mont. Laws 316 § 24).
118. MONT. CODE ANN. § 90-3-416 (1987) (repealed by 1989 Mont. Laws 316 § 24).
119. 233 Mont. 81, 759 P.2d 971 (1988).
120.. Id. at 85, 759 P.2d at 973.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 85-86, 759 P.2d at 973-74.
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The court acknowledged that funds initially appropriated to the
Board would be appropriated to an entity under the control of the
state within the meaning of the Appropriation Clause.126 "How-
ever, the significance of this argument would diminish greatly once
bonds were issued. 12
7
The court then described the procedure by which the state's
coal severance tax would be transferred to pay debt service on the
bonds if the returns on the investment and other available funds
were inadequate.1 28 Presumably this appropriation, because it
pledges the credit of the state to secure the bonds issued by the
Board, the proceeds of which are used for the benefit of private
business," is the appropriation that violates the Appropriation
Clause.1 29 The court did not address the question of whether the
invalid appropriation could be offset by a public purpose.
VII. CONCLUSION
It seems fairly clear that in the abstract, within the meaning
of the provisions of the Montana Constitution, a particular pro-
gram or activity is likely to be considered a public purpose that
justifies or permits some level or type of public funding if the pro-
gram or activity has one or more of the following characteristics:
1. It has traditionally been conducted by government.
2. It cannot be conducted as effectively by the private sector or
without the government sponsorship.
3. It benefits primarily or directly all citizens or a general class or
segment of citizens; a public purpose is more easily found if the
benefits are not principally in the business activities of the bene-
fited class.
4. The program or activity is reasonably related to the intended
benefit.
At first blush, it seems curious to speak of public purpose in a
context other than that of the Public Purpose Clause. Of the three
sections discussed here, only the Public Purpose Clause expressly
refers to public purpose. Neither the Appropriation Clause nor the
Loan of Credit Clause of the 1889 Constitution refers to public
purpose. But the outcome of cases litigating both of those sections
repeatedly refer to and are based upon public purpose.
Thus, in State ex rel. Campbell v. Stewart the court could say
126. Id.
127. Id.
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that, notwithstanding that proceeds of general-obligation bonds of
the state would be loaned to farmers for use in their business of
farming, the "outstanding and controlling public purpose" of pro-
moting agricultural production to support the war effort "is the
end that justifies the means.""'s The State ex rel. Cryderman v.
Wienrich case, involving loans by counties to needy farmers from
proceeds of general-obligation bonds of the counties, stands for the
same proposition with stronger language: "If the act under consid-
eration is not violative of the one [i.e., the Public Purpose Clause]
it is not violative of the other [i.e., the Loan of Credit Clause]." 131
And as the Willett v. State Board of Examiners case holds: "The
test to be adopted in determining whether a donation or grant is
prohibited under [the Loan of Credit Clause] is whether the dona-
tion or grant is for a public purpose."12
Although these cases have not been overruled or discredited, a
number of cases seem to contradict them. In the Veterans Welfare
Commission v. VFW case, the court said that even though an en-
tity's use of funds is for a public purpose, if the entity is not under
the control of the state a gift to the entity is forbidden by the Ap-
propriation Clause. 33
To be sure, in a few cases the court has resolved the dilemma
or finessed the question by finding that although the public funds
are ultimately used by private parties for their business purposes,
the appropriation of public funds is to a public entity-one con-
trolled by the state-and therefore no impermissible gift or appro-
priation exists. State ex rel. Normile v. Cooney,1'3 Douglas v.
Judge,"35 and Grossman v. State Department of Natural Re-
sources36 all are based on this analysis, but the more recent deci-
sions in Hollow v. State1 37 and White v. State'3 8 refuse this analy-
sis, looking instead to the ultimate use of funds.
It is logically difficult to accept the proposition that whether a
program or activity serves a public purpose and does not constitute
an impermissible appropriation to an entity not under the control
of the state depends upon whether the particular program or activ-
ity is funded by taxes or by non-tax sources. But in light of the
130. 54 Mont. 504, 510, 171 P. 755, 757 (1918).
131. 54 Mont. 390, 170 P. 942 (1918).
132. 112 Mont. 317, 322, 115 P.2d 287, 289 (1941).
133. 141 Mont 500, 379 P.2d 107 (1963).
134. 100 Mont. 391, 47 P.2d 637 (1935).
135. 174 Mont. 32, 568 P.2d 530 (1977).
136. 209 Mont. 427, 682 P.2d 1319 (1984).
137. 222 Mont. 478, 723 P.2d 227 (1986).
138. 233 Mont. 81, 759 P.2d 971 (1988).
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decisions discussed in this paper, the truth of the proposition
seems inescapable. Consider the Hill v. Rae case, which dealt with
a farm-loan program funded by revenue bonds enhanced by a
guaranty fund of tax dollars.139 The court upheld the program as a
public purpose, but struck down the guaranty fund.1"4 Compare
Huber v. GrofP41 with Hollow v. State.14 In Huber, the court up-
held the state Housing Act, under which the Board of Housing
would fund its housing programs from proceeds of bonds payable
from non-tax revenues of the programs. 14 The bonds also were se-
cured by a "moral obligation pledge," which obligated the governor
to include in his budget, for consideration by the legislature, any
appropriation necessary to make up any deficit in revenues availa-
ble for debt service on such revenue bonds.14 4 In Hollow, the court
struck down a law authorizing the Board of Investments to pledge
coal severance taxes to make up any deficiency in revenues availa-
ble to pay debt service on revenue bonds the proceeds of which
were used to fund economic development loans."45 In Huber, then,
a housing program supported by revenue bonds and a "moral obli-
gation [contingent] pledge" of taxes was upheld, while in Hollow
an economic-development program supported by revenue bonds
and a pledge of coal severance taxes was struck down.
The court has not yet acknowledged expressly what seems to
be implied by its decisions, that there may be two levels, or tiers,
of public purpose. The first tier is so clear and definite that in its
pursuit tax dollars may be pledged and used. The other is less
clear, perhaps less demanding of government action, perhaps in-
volving a greater degree of private benefit, in pursuit of which tax
dollars cannot be spent or pledged but other, non-tax revenues
may be spent or pledged.
It is confusing, at best, to have the court suggest that the eco-
nomic-development programs enacted in Hollow and White were
not for a public purpose, when a very similar economic-develop-
ment program (retention or increase in employment opportunities,
additional taxes, increased economic activity) was upheld in
Fickes. It seems disingenuous of the court to find, as it did in
Hollow and in White, impermissible appropriations to private par-
ties not under control of the state, when in Douglas and Grossman
139. 52 Mont. 378, 158 P. 826 (1916).
140. Id. at 389-90, 158 P.2d at 831.
141. 171 Mont. 442, 558 P.2d 1124 (1976).
142. 222 Mont. 478, 723 P.2d 227 (1986).
143. Huber, 171 Mont. at 461, 558 P.2d at 1134.
144. Id. at 451-52, 558 P.2d at 1129.
145. Hollow, 222 Mont. at 486-87, 723 P.2d at 232-33.
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the court held the appropriations were to the state agency that al-
located the money to the private parties. Unless the court is pre-
pared to retreat from Hollow and White, to allow the use of tax
money in support of economic-development programs which also
benefit private businesses, it would be helpful if the court at least
would fully articulate its concept of two tiers of public purposes.
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